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ABSTRACT  The International Criminal Court (ICC) announced its investigation into the
situation in northern Uganda in January 2004. Controversy ensued as to whether so-called 
Acholi traditional justice or the ICC would be more appropriate to handle the crimes  committed 
during the confl ict. In the course of the debates on this matter, it has widely been stated that 
Acholi traditional justice is restorative, while ICC justice is retributive. This paper shows that 
such a narrative is not necessarily self-evident. The paper also examines the complex process
through which various local and outside agencies sought to revive Acholi tradition after the
mid 1990s, leading to the development of the above narrative. Such an examination reveals the
competing visions of governance that have been at work behind the revival. In the course of 
this revival, outside agencies have projected their conception of the self upon the Acholi  people
and their vision of therapeutic governance upon Acholi tradition. However, this vision of 
governance is not necessarily shared by all Acholi proponents of their “tradition” who have
cooperated with outside agencies. Rather, the therapeutic paradigm of governance seems to
have been (re)interpreted and utilized by various Acholi actors who have held differing and, at 
times, hybrid worldviews.
Key Words: Acholi; Culture; Trauma; Biopolitics; Transitional Justice; Reconciliation; Peace
Building.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, confl icts in southern countries, especially in Africa, have
attracted much international attention. Aid donors, researchers, and the media have
consistently described these confl icts as different in nature from those in the past,
largely internal or regional, often identity-based, and characterized by excessive
violence upon civilian populations (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Collier, 2000; Kaldor,
1999). In order to respond to such confl icts, a number of so-called peace  building
or confl ict-prevention interventions have unfolded, with wide-ranging actors includ-
ing donor countries, United Nations (UN) agencies, and non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs). These actors have generally argued that such international inter-
ventions should address the need to transform southern societies as a whole,
including attitudes, beliefs, emotions, and intimate relations (World Bank & Carter 
Center, 1997). At times, they have incorporated “traditional” or “cultural”  practices
and ideas in their efforts to achieve social transformation. For instance, in  countries
such as Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, and Uganda,
traditional or cultural institutions and values were expected to contribute to  bringing
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justice to victims, reconciling the society, reintegrating ex-soldiers, or promoting
a  culture of peace (Huyse & Salter, 2008).
In the Acholi sub-region of northern Uganda, aid donors sought to revive the
tradition from the latter half of the 1990s onwards, because they assumed that 
Acholi traditional ideas and practices would be effective in reintegrating ex- soldiers
and reconciling the society. So-called Acholi tradition then faced criticisms but 
also garnered continued support from outside actors after the International  Criminal
Court (ICC) announced its planned investigation into the situation in northern
Uganda in 2004. In the course of the debates that followed, it was widely  narrated 
that Acholi traditional justice is restorative, while ICC justice is retributive.
A counter-literature in the fi eld of international relations has emerged as a
critique of the recent peace building and development technologies as well as
their underlying assumptions (Abrahamson, 2005; Biccum, 2005; Chandler, 2010;
Duffi eld, 2001; Furedi, 2007; Newman, 2010; Pupavac, 2004; Reid, 2010).  Duffi eld 
(2001) argues that the manner in which a network of global governance  constructed 
and interpreted the post Cold War confl icts led to a merger between development 
and security, and it was an important part of the West’s moral justifi cation for 
its system-wide intervention. Duffi eld and Waddell (2004) point out that policy-
makers have rediscovered that confl icts pose a threat to human development; they
destroy the homeostatic nature of populations and leave individuals  psychologically
impaired. Pupavac (2001a; 2001b; 2004) uses the term “therapeutic governance,”
and explains that the contemporary Western therapeutic perspectives have been
applied to international confl ict management since the 1990s. As a result, wars
are now perceived as illegitimate and traced to the psychological and social
dysfunctionalism of individuals. She claims that such demoralization of southern
populations questions their right to self-government and autonomy, and legitimizes
an extensive outside intervention in economic policy, the political system, cultural
institutions and values, relations within the family and clan, and the individual’s
psychological condition.
Focusing on Pupavac’s concept of global therapeutic governance, this paper 
critically analyzes the dominant narrative of Acholi traditional justice and the
efforts to incorporate Acholi tradition into peace building initiatives. Based on
my fi eldwork, literature review, as well as on my eight years of experience  working
for one of the international NGOs that partook in the “justice” debates,(1) I dem-
onstrate the complex process whereby outside agencies projected the vision of 
therapeutic governance onto Acholi tradition in the course of the revival. Despite
its extensive incursion into Acholi social life with a possible infl uence on the
course of the confl ict, I reveal the rather contingent and fragile disposition of the
therapeutic vision of governance in the Acholi sub-region.
THE ICC AND THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA
The ICC is the fi rst permanent international tribunal to try individuals accused of 
serious international crimes, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. The ICC can persecute such crimes  committed on or after July 1, 2002,
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when the Rome Statute of the ICC entered into force. To date,(2) all of the six
situations into which the court has opened investigations have been in Africa.(3)
Therefore, the actual activities of the ICC have  necessarily been regarded as part 
of the international commitment to end the culture of  impunity, establish the rule
of law, prevent future atrocities, and build peace in the confl ict-ridden area. On
the other hand, the ICC has faced a number of  diffi cult issues in each situation,
and the case of northern Uganda is no exception.
In January 1986, the southern-based army, led by the current president Yoweri
Museveni, overthrew Tito Okello’s regime, which was dominated by Acholis.
Absorbing many soldiers of the former regime who had fl ed to the north, a num-
ber of anti-government forces were formed. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),
led by an Acholi, Joseph Kony, emerged in the late 1980s, and the war between
the LRA and the government forces, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF),
persists to date. While claiming that it was fi ghting for the Acholi people, the
LRA started to abduct people, especially Acholis, from northern Uganda and 
ordered them to commit atrocities against their families and communities. The
government forces have also been regularly accused by human rights  organizations
of committing atrocities in northern Uganda (Human Rights Watch, 2003).
Therefore, when the newly formed ICC announced its fi rst investigation into
the situation following a referral by the government of Uganda, both the LRA 
and the UPDF seemed to be appropriate targets for the court. However, this was
met with an unexpected barrage of criticism from the so-called traditional and 
religious leaders(4) of the most affected Acholi sub-region(5) as well as from local
and international aid organizations working in the sub-region. Some voiced  concerns
that the ICC would be used as a political tool by the Ugandan government that 
wanted to gain international support for its policy of “military solution” to the
confl ict. Others argued that the ICC was unlikely to deal with the crimes  committed 
by the government forces and that this would, therefore, worsen the north-south
divide that was created through colonial rule and that fuelled much of the  country’s
post-independence political turmoil. It was also pointed out that the investigation
would complicate any efforts to negotiate with the LRA and might prolong the
war and the associated suffering of the people, approximately 90% of whom were
by then confi ned in squalid camps. In addition, many critics vehemently argued 
that Acholi traditional justice was more appropriate than the ICC to  handle the
crimes committed during the confl ict. In response to such criticisms, some
researchers and international NGOs, especially international human rights NGOs,
claimed that it was the ICC, and not Acholi traditional justice, that would deliver 
true justice and lasting peace in northern Uganda.
As the heated debates continued, the ICC decided to launch a formal  investigation
in July 2004, and it issued sealed arrest warrants for fi ve senior members of the
LRA(6) in July 2005; these were unsealed in October 2005. During the peace talks
initiated in 2006, the LRA and the Ugandan government sought to satisfy the
ICC’s principle of complementarity(7) by agreeing on a national alternative  judicial
approach that would incorporate elements of traditional justice. However, the fi nal
agreement has still not been signed by the rebel leader Kony. None of the fi ve
members was ever arrested, and two of them(8) are reported to have died.
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Furthermore, the ICC has not issued arrest warrants for any UPDF commanders
or Ugandan government offi cials.
NARRATIVES ON ACHOLI TRADITIONAL JUSTICE
One of the central issues in the controversy over the ICC’s intervention has
been what kind of justice is more appropriate to handle the crimes committed in
the confl ict. Most often, Acholi traditional justice has been described as  restorative
justice based on forgiveness and reconciliation (Blumenson, 2006; Civil Society
Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, 2005; Nielsen, 2008; Volqvartz,
2005), and has been shown in contrast to the ICC’s “retributive” justice. For 
instance, Lacey (2005) reported the following:
The two very different systems—one based on Western notions of justice,
the other on a deep African tradition of forgiveness—are clashing in their 
response to one of this continent’s most bizarre and brutal guerrilla wars,
a confl ict that has raged for 18 years in the rugged terrain along Uganda’s
border with Sudan.
The aim of Acholi traditional justice has often been explained as the  restoration
of relationships. Among many local practices, a ritual called mato oput,(9)  generally
applied in cases of murder, is most frequently cited in narratives explaining Acholi
traditional justice. For instance, Greenawalt (2009: 116) wrote the following:
Although the particular elements of the mato oput may differ from case to
case, the defi ning feature of this tradition is that it restores social harmony
after a homicide through confessions, negotiated compensation, and, ultimately,
reconciliation between the offender and the victim’s kin. The process cul-
minates in a ritual whose individualized elements—typically including the
beating of a stick, ritual slaughter, and the eating and drinking of various
substances (including the “bitter root” for which the ceremony is named)—
all play a symbolic role in furthering the goals of truth seeking and recon-
ciliation. Alongside the Amnesty Act, these and other cleansing rituals have
played an important role to date in the reintegration of former LRA  members
into their communities.
Based on this narrative on Acholi traditional justice, some researchers,  activists,
journalists, and aid workers, particularly the non-Acholis, have tended to  understand 
that Acholi traditional justice has no punitive elements or is irreconcilable with
the idea of punishment (Branch, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2005; Lacey, 2005).
Some supporters of Acholi traditional justice have argued as if the Acholi people
have a special ability to forgive, while some critics, especially international human
rights NGOs, have condemned Acholi traditional justice for being equal to  impunity.
For instance, Human Rights Watch (2005: 55) argued as follows:
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A major shortcoming of the traditional reconciliation approach is the  tolerance
of impunity. The process involves acceptance of perpetrators back into the
community after certain rituals, but does not take into account the views
of the individual victims who might not want to forgive serious crimes, nor 
does it require the perpetrators be punished or pay material compensation
to the victims.
However, the above narrative and understanding are not necessarily self-evident.
The concept of restorative justice itself emerged through efforts to reform the
justice system in Western societies during the 1970s (Zehr, 1990). Beginning as
an alternative to, or a complementary mechanism of, the existing “retributive”
justice system in the US, Canada, and other Western countries, it is often  contrasted 
with retributive justice, as shown below (See Table 1).
In general, retributive justice is associated with proportionate punishment, and 
it is said to focus on making the perpetrator of a crime pay for his or her actions.
Restorative justice is commonly associated with the participation of the victim,
offender, and the wider community. It is said that the latter seeks to empower 
and restore the dignity of the victim and place greater value on reintegrating the
offenders into society (Hovil & Quinne, 2005).
This classifi cation of justice mechanisms moved into the international arena in
the 1990s, when transitional justice became one of the core issues among inter-
national policymakers in the context of peace building and confl ict prevention.
Although Acholi traditional justice is associated with restorative justice, a close
examination of local practices indicates that it is also possible to apply the retrib-
utive framework in making sense of them.
While conducting my fi eldwork in northern Uganda in 2006, I learned that the
term “traditional justice” is often expressed in the local language as ngol matir
(right decision) or ngol me te kwaro (decision according to tradition).(10) While
Table 1. Frequently cited differences between restorative justice and retributive justice
Retributive Justice Restorative Justice
[A] Nature of Crime Crime violates the law. Crime harms victim, community, 
offender and social relationships.
[B] Aim Establish guilt and administer 
proportionate retribution to the
offender.
Identify needs and obligations, and 
repair the harm caused by the crime.
[C]  Responsibility of the
 Offender
Fulfi lled by being punished. Fulfi lled by making amends and 
making right the harm done, and by
understanding the harm caused.
[D] Offender in the Process Passive and marginal in the
 process.
Has a central role in the process.
[E] Victim in the Process Passive and marginal in the
 process.
Has a central role in the process.
[F] Key Actors in the Process Legal and judicial professionals. Victim, offender and their 
community.
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the ICC deals with crimes within its jurisdiction in accordance with the Rome
Statute, Acholi traditional justice, in a sense, decides the appropriate processes,
including rituals and compensation, in accordance with the customary law of the
group (e.g., clan) that has jurisdiction over the crime concerned. The document,
“Law to Declare the Acholi Customary Law,” prepared by the Acholi traditional
leaders (Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2001), states the following under the clause,
“ Punishment”:
Any person who contravenes any provision of any section of this law
commits an offence against the customary law of the Acholi and shall be
punished or ordered to pay reparations in accordance with the appropriate
customary practices/punishment as declared and defi ned in the Schedule of 
this Law.
The most appropriate ritual and the type, number, sex, and color of the animal(s)
necessary for the particular process depend on the kind of taboo, or crime,
committed. Generally, the abovementioned mato oput is applied in cases of  murder.
Other rituals are applied in other kinds of crimes. The type and amount of 
compensation in cases of killing a person may differ, depending on, among other 
factors, whether the act was intentional, accidental, or in self-defense, the status
of the victim, and the relationship between the offender and the victim.
Here, a crime can be explained as a violation of the customary law ([A] in
Table 1). The offender is expected to go through the appropriate process and is
burdened with a proportionate amount of compensation ([B] in Table 1). While
the clans of the offender and the victim participate in determining the suitable
ritual and compensation, these are principally decided by the chiefs and elders in
accordance with the law in which they specialize ([D], [E], [F] in Table 1).
In terms of the responsibility of the offender, some understand that Acholi
traditional justice is about reconciliation and forgiveness and is, therefore, irrec-
oncilable with the idea of punishment. However, in my interviews with Acholi
NGO staff and traditional leaders, elements that can be termed as repentance and 
compensation were often given rather punitive meanings and portrayed as
 preconditions for what can be described as reconciliation, forgiveness, and the
restoration of relationships. For example, an Acholi NGO staff member explained 
the following:
If you kill somebody, the offender has to really regret it, and must live
with members of his clan and the victim’s clan, who have suffered because
of his action. The offender and his family and clan members suffer because
of the large amount of compensation. In addition to the impoverishment of 
your family and your clan, you have to face the suffering or the fear of 
suffering caused by the victim’s spirit, to yourself, your family, and clan.(11)
The victim’s clan members can forgive, because they see the offender’s
clan suffer so much and because the lost life is restored through  compensation.
You try to prevent future crimes because, otherwise, the whole of your clan
would suffer.(12)
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In fact, the documents prepared by Acholi NGO staff or traditional leaders,
such as the abovementioned document, “Law to Declare the Acholi Customary
Law,” tend to equate compensation with punishment. A document written by a
local researcher, “The Acholi People’s Rites of Reconciliation,” explains that an
offender “is made to pay a less severe punishment” in cases of unintentional
murder (J. Okumu, 2005: 10). In fact, in the local language, the term culu wang 
kwor means “pay compensation (for the killing committed),” when the offender 
or his or her family or clan is the subject of the sentence, whereas it means “pay
back to the violent act” or “commit a revenge killing” when the victim’s family
or clan is the subject of the sentence. An Acholi NGO staff member who  mentioned 
this to me added, “I think it is because there is the element of pay back in
both.” (13)
Such statements and descriptions seem consistent with the results of the inter-
views conducted by the researchers of the Refugee Law Project (Hovil & Quinne,
2005). They noticed that the interviewees spoke of a number of different  solutions
that drew on different models of justice, including both restorative and  retributive
ideas. This report pointed out that the Acholi justice mechanism encompasses
facets of both restoration and retribution and, therefore, the informants do not 
distinguish between the two, and often speak of both at the same time. In  addition,
what can be interpreted as the principle of proportionate retribution, punishment 
for violations of the customary law, or suffering caused by spirits after violations
of the law, can be found in earlier studies (Girling, 1960; C. Okumu, 2000;
p’Bitek, 1971).
To conclude, Acholi traditional justice need not merely be narrated in line with
the idea of restorative justice. However, I do not argue that Acholi traditional
justice must be understood as retributive justice or as a combination of, or some-
where between, restorative justice and retributive justice. As I describe later in
this paper, the local practices currently described as Acholi traditional justice have
historically been understood by outside actors within various frameworks, such
as traditional medicine and Acholi religion, which implies that they do not, in
fact, need to be narrated as justice mechanisms. My observation above is simply
an experiment to recognize the local practices as justice mechanisms and to make
sense of them through the retributive lens. It merely shows that if we try to do
so, it is also possible to describe the local practices in accordance with the idea
of retributive justice. However, in the actual debates following the ICC  intervention,
Acholi traditional justice has widely been perceived as a form of restorative
 justice, and some researchers, activists, and aid workers, particularly the non-
Acholis among them, have tended to understand that Acholi traditional justice is
irreconcilable with the idea of punishment.
REVIVAL OF ACHOLI TRADITION SINCE THE 1990S
Why were the local practices so widely narrated within the framework of restor-
ative justice in the debate following the ICC intervention? In order to answer 
this question, I propose contextualizing the narrative within the international atten-
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tion and support given to the “revival of Acholi tradition” since the 1990s. In
fact, after the ICC intervention, most international NGOs that favored Acholi
traditional justice were already working in cooperation with the traditional lead-
ers or had incorporated some elements of Acholi tradition into their projects. The
documents and statements issued by these NGOs in English became the major 
source of information for others involved in the debates following the ICC inter-
vention, such as non-Acholi international lawyers and journalists.
The notion of Acholi tradition started to gain international support after the
1997 publication of an infl uential research paper jointly commissioned by Inter-
national Alert, an international NGO based in the UK, and Kacoke Madit, a forum
initiated by some Acholis in diaspora. The report, titled “The Bending of the
Spears,” compiled the views on peace and reconciliation of so-called Acholi
opinion leaders (Pain, 1997). In the report, author Dennis Pain(14) argued that the
confl ict was eroding Acholi culture and that a community-based approach  drawing
on Acholi culture, values, and institutions was necessary to bring peace and devel-
opment to the area. The report highlighted the aforementioned ritual called mato
oput as the traditional reconciliation and confl ict resolution mechanism and called 
for international support of “the traditional authorities in establishing the recon-
ciliation procedures to be used in resolving the confl ict” (Pain, 1997: 86).
The report proved to be extremely infl uential among some international NGOs
and other donors. In 1999, the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Devel-
opment (ACORD), another international NGO, conducted research fi nanced by
the Belgian government. Building on Pain’s report, this research aimed to under-
stand how the chieftaincy system had been affected by the war and whether 
“ traditional healing and community reconciliation processes” were being conducted.
Together with local government offi cials and Christian religious leaders, the
ACORD staff traveled throughout the sub-region to identify the “traditional” lead-
ers and to discuss what their role could and should be (Bradbury, 1999: 18).
Based on the fi ndings of this research, the chiefs identifi ed were formally
reinstated, and the chief of the Payira clan was elected as the paramount chief 
in 1999. Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA), an institution consisting mainly of the
paramount chief, chiefs, and elders, was established in 2000. Prior to this, there
was, in essence, no institution such as the KKA to bring together all the chiefs
of the area. The title of paramount chief, Lawi Rwodi,(15) was also new (Liu
Institute for Global Issues et al., 2005: 44). The internationally and locally supported 
efforts that followed to restore or empower the roles of traditional leaders and 
institutions greatly increased the presence and infl uence of the traditional leaders
in the area.(16)
In general, aid agencies supported the revival of Acholi tradition under the
frameworks of reconciliation or the reintegration of ex-soldiers (Afako, 2003;
Bradbury, 1999; Simonse, 1998), which were given great importance in the context 
of peace building or confl ict prevention after the mid-1990s. Under such
frameworks, one of the main problems was identifi ed as “trauma” and the associated 
conduct of former LRA members, many of whom had been abducted and forced 
to become soldiers or the “wives” of soldiers. They were perceived as having
the tendency or potential to resort to violence due to their violent experiences in
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the bush. Aid agencies expected that traditional rituals would be effective in
dealing with the psychological problems and violent tendencies of the former 
LRA members. They hoped that the rituals would help promote acceptance by
the community, restore social relationships, and bring about reconciliation. They
also believed that education on Acholi traditional values should be an integral
part of peace education or the promotion of the culture of peace. At the level of 
aid projects, such traditional elements were most often incorporated under the
label of “psychosocial activities.”
Although there is no clear and shared defi nition of psychosocial activities among
aid agencies, such activities have been extremely popular among them since the
1990s and have become one of the major components of aid projects (Pupavac,
2001a). Activities that come under this category include, for example, trauma
counseling, non-violent confl ict resolution programs, self-esteem classes, sport 
activities, and dance and music lessons. Today, most aid organizations tend to
encourage psychosocial activities based on local culture, tradition, or religion, so
long as their consequences appear similar to those of activities more strictly
founded on psychology. In the Acholi sub-region, outside agencies expected Acholi
tradition to provide a culturally relevant way to heal the “trauma” of the Acholi
individuals including former LRA members, to restore social relationships, break 
the cycle of violence, and to thereby build peace and prevent future violence.
However, in reality, mato oput and other ritual processes that require  considerable
compensation were simply unaffordable to many. Before the peace talks started 
in 2006, more than 90% of the population in the sub-region was contained in
squalid internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Although the government called 
them “protected villages,” UPDF soldiers frequently failed to protect them from
LRA attacks and were often themselves accused of violent conduct against the
IDPs. Movement between camps was restricted, and even daytime movement 
risked ambush by the LRA. Having lost their livestock and being detached from
their fi elds, most IDPs had to rely on aid supplies. There was also the issue of 
whether the process of mato oput was applicable to the killings committed in
this confl ict by former LRA members, most of whom were abductees who had 
been forced to commit such crimes, often against people whose identities they
did not know (Enomoto, 2007). As a result, what was actually practiced in the
course of aid projects was the kind of modifi ed ritual processes that placed little
or no fi nancial burden on the former LRA members (Enomoto, 2006; 2007).
Animals necessary for such rituals were substituted by cheaper animals or other 
materials, or were provided by aid agencies. Thus, the actual modifi ed practices
of Acholi traditional justice had to focus on what can be termed as cleansing,
reception, and forgiveness. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that international
NGOs that had been cooperating with traditional leaders or incorporating elements
of Acholi tradition into their projects portrayed Acholi traditional justice as
restorative after the ICC intervention. Their reports, statements, press releases,
and  testimonies written or orally narrated in English were among the major sources
of information for many other non-Acholis who engaged in the debates  following
the ICC intervention.(17)
Other major non-Acholi actors who voiced their opinions after the ICC
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intervention were those with a legal background who specialized in the domestic
judicial system or transitional justice. As pointed out in Pain’s report (1997: 58),
during the 1990s, some lawyers had already shown interest in what is currently
referred to as Acholi traditional justice. In general, those legal minds perceived 
the so-called traditional practices as constituting an alternative justice mechanism
in the period of transition from confl ict to peace (Liu Institute for Global Issues
et al., 2005: 4). Although Pain’s report at one point contrasted “traditional  justice”
with “Western law,” it did not use the term “restorative justice” to describe it.
In documents produced by NGOs and researchers before the ICC intervention,
including Pain’s, the local practices currently framed as “Acholi traditional  justice”
were most often referred to as traditional reconciliation or traditional confl ict 
resolution mechanisms (Afako, 2003).(18) However, in the debates following the
ICC intervention, the local practices came to be increasingly framed as Acholi
traditional justice and discussed from the viewpoint of transitional justice.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, restorative justice was proposed in the 1970s
in Western societies as an alternative to, or a complementary mechanism of, the
existing justice system. It is commonly associated with participation of the  victim,
perpetrator, and the wider community, and it is expected to contribute to the
healing of both victims and offenders, the reintegration of the offenders, and the
restoration of relationships in their community. After gaining popularity in  Western
societies, the concept of restorative justice moved into the international arena in
the 1990s, when transitional justice became one of the core issues in the context 
of peace building and confl ict prevention among international policymakers. Tran-
sitional justice most often refers to a range of justice approaches adapted to
societies in transition after a period of pervasive human rights abuse. Encompass-
ing both restorative and retributive approaches, transitional justice is generally
expected to play a role in healing individual trauma, promoting a sense of emo-
tional well-being by bringing justice to victims, and thus, addressing both the
consequences and the causes of violence. Among its various approaches, restor-
ative justice, in particular, is expected to heal both offenders and victims, restore
broken social relationships, and help offenders such as ex-soldiers reintegrate into
the community.
Obviously, there is some overlap between the reintegration of ex-soldiers and 
restorative justice. Therefore, when those who specialize in transitional justice
learned of the statements and documents by NGOs, researchers, and traditional
leaders on the local practices in the context of the reintegration of former LRA 
members, they were likely to have perceived the practices in the framework of 
restorative justice. The fact that other post-confl ict justice mechanisms adopted in
Africa since the 1990s, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South
Africa and the Gacaca of Rwanda, are often portrayed as restorative in the study
of transitional justice, may have been an additional factor that reinforced their 
conviction.
Furthermore, in the early stage of the controversy, those outside of the sub-
region who took an interest had very little information on the details of the local
practices described as Acholi traditional justice beyond vague and normative
descriptions. There was also a general lack of easily accessible documentation on
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the local practices (Liu Institute for Global Issues et al., 2005: 2). After the ICC
intervention, Acholi NGO staff and traditional leaders claimed that the process
of mato oput would be applicable to the LRA leaders such as Kony, often  arguing
that other rituals had already taken place for former LRA members. However, as
noted earlier, most of these actual ritual processes required little or no compen-
sation. Moreover, Acholi NGO staff and traditional leaders frequently explained 
traditional rituals in connection with the Amnesty Act of 2000 (Amnesty Act,
2000), which was meant to encourage the return and reintegration of the LRA 
members. The Preamble of the Act states that the purpose of the Act is “to
 provide for an Amnesty for Ugandans involved in acts of a war-like nature in
various parts of the country and for other connected purposes.” Section 9(c) of 
the Act requires the Amnesty Commission, established to implement the Act, to
“consider and promote appropriate mechanisms of reconciliation in affected areas.”
Based on this provision, subjecting the former LRA members to the traditional
mechanisms was deemed to provide a complementary role to the Act (Liu  Institute
for Global Issues et al., 2005: 44). Indeed, rituals that focused on cleansing and 
reception into society of the former LRA members can be explained as being
within the confi nes of Acholi traditional justice, as long as they were decided in
accordance with customary law.
However, to those unaccustomed to the differences among the various ritual
processes, this explanation may have reinforced the conviction that mato oput
was aimed at cleansing, forgiveness, and amnesty. The same could be said of 
those who were unaware of the relationship between the Amnesty Act and Acholi
traditional justice, or those who only knew the common narrative of traditional
justice that it was restorative. In fact, some reports confused mato oput with other 
rituals that focused on cleansing and reception, and they stated that all the  Acholis
wanted was to cleanse and forgive the LRA leaders (Glassborow, 2006; Lacey,
2005). Moreover, many Christian leaders, who also have a certain level of infl u-
ence in this sub-region, have often described Acholi traditional justice from their 
viewpoint of Christian mercy. The fact that their accounts were frequently reported 
by the media and researchers immediately following the ICC intervention may
have further prompted the idea that Acholi traditional justice was all about mercy
and forgiveness.
EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL THERAPEUTIC GOVERNANCE
Since the 1990s, aid donors, researchers, and the media have consistently argued 
that recent wars, unlike those in the past, have been mostly civil confl icts and 
have tended to involve unusual violence deliberately directed against civilians and 
essential infrastructures, livelihood systems, and cultural institutions (Boutros-
Ghali, 1992; Collier, 2000; Commission for Africa, 2005; Commission on Human
Security, 2003; Kaldor, 1999). As Duffi eld and Waddell (2004) point out, confl ict 
came to be understood as a biopolitical threat to human development—as some-
thing that destroys the homeostatic nature of populations, wrecking infrastructures
and livelihood systems, tipping them into disequilibrium, and leaving individuals
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psychologically dysfunctional. At the same time, this thinking has it that poorer 
countries are at a higher risk of falling into confl ict than richer ones because the
poor experience more acute anger, grievance, and frustration; therefore, they are
more likely to be drawn in by violent leaders or to believe that they have more
to gain from war than peace (Anderson, 1996; Commission on Human Security,
2003). Distressful experiences such as confl icts are considered to trigger traumatic
symptoms that cause dysfunctionalism, leading to a vicious cycle of trauma and 
violence (Commission for Africa, 2005: 152; Millennium Project, 2005: 187).
The ideas behind this concern over a population’s psychology can be traced to
the reinterpretation of social problems as issues of emotional functionalism/ 
dysfunctionalism in Western societies in the latter half of the twentieth century,
where a lack of strong, shared convictions and collective consciousness led to
the conception of the self as vulnerable (Pupavac, 2004). In the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, psychologists and sociologists argued that the masses
were driven by their emotions rather than by reason, while the elites could act 
rationally (Le Bon, 2002; Ortega y Gasset, 1964; Trotter, 2009). Compared to the
earlier arguments, contemporary therapeutic approaches now widely accepted in
Western societies exhibit a more general retreat from the belief in rationalist 
approaches (Pupavac, 2000). The dichotomies between health and disease, sanity
and insanity, normalcy and abnormalcy, rationality and irrationality have become
blurred (Nakajima, 2008). Instead of placing individuals on either side of these
binary divides, the contemporary therapeutic approaches view individuals as uni-
versally susceptible to psychological and social dysfunctionalism, with varying
degrees of risk (Nakajima, 2008). The political ideal of the individual as a mature,
autonomous, rational subject has been replaced by a postmodern model of the
vulnerable self who is at risk of dysfunction (Pupavac, 2006). Public policy is
premised on the assumption of this general vulnerability, and the provision of 
counseling is now a routine feature in schools and workplaces. The idea of restor-
ative justice aiming to heal the psychological wounds of offenders, victims, and 
communities has, thus, gained popularity as a way to reform justice systems.
Despite the increasing concern over psychological and social dysfunctionalism
in Western societies in the latter half of the twentieth century, the idea of  reducing
the causes of war to individual psychology was challenged by national liberation
movements, newly independent states, and the Soviet bloc in the post-war period 
(Pupavac, 2001a). They criticized that such an idea delegitimized the liberation
movements, neglected the wider structural issues and international aspects of 
confl icts, and would lead to interference in the domestic affairs of states and the
erosion of the right to national self-determination. However, after the demise of 
the Soviet bloc and the Non-Aligned Movement, the therapeutic understanding of 
southern confl icts started to dominate donor policy documents and academic
literature. By this time, therapeutic perspectives had been deeply rooted in the
way people in Western societies, including aid workers, researchers, and policy-
makers, understood themselves and others.
Southern populations, especially those that have been affected by war, are now
regarded as being at a higher risk of emotional dysfunctionalism. While Western
colonialists painted wars among Africans or their resistance to colonization as
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manifestations of their irrationality and backwardness, the current interpretation
of southern confl icts is not based on a dichotomy between rationality and 
irrationality.(19) Rather, it is the higher risk of dysfunctionalism that is viewed as
problematic and dangerous. Based on this thinking, the emotional state of  southern
populations has become a major concern for international policymakers (Pupavac,
2001a; 2001b; 2004). Coupled with the gradual shift from the late 1960s onwards
in the notion of development from material transformation to basic needs,  resilience,
and psychological well-being, development and security agendas merged in the
1990s (Duffi eld & Waddell, 2004). The line between humanitarian aid and devel-
opment aid has become blurred. Known as “new humanitarianism,” humanitarian
aid came to be expected to play an integral part in donors’ strategies to prevent 
future violence and set the stage for sustainable development (Anderson, 1996).
A range of development and peace building technologies has been devised to act 
on populations to improve their resilience, satisfy basic needs, promote inclusion,
and ensure the psychological and moral development of individuals and commu-
nities (Duffi eld & Waddell, 2004).
Termed “therapeutic governance” by Pupavac (2001b), not only inter-ethnic
relations, economic policy, or political system, but also a population’s  psychology
and intimate relationships are now the targets of global governance.  Proponents
of such therapeutic intervention do not necessarily perceive their approach as
challenging the autonomy of societies and individuals, since they promote it under 
the name of empowerment (Pupavac, 2000). They understand it as a “new and 
improved” (Easterly, 2003) approach that effectively addresses the criticism of 
earlier practices of development and humanitarian aid as being paternalistic and 
disempowering. However, this approach that supposedly empowers individuals
and builds a peaceful democratic society is founded on the model of the self as
ever-vulnerable to risk and dysfunctionalism, not an autonomous rational subject 
and, therefore, legitimizes pacifi cation interventions at the level of people’s  personal
emotions and intimate relations. While the focus is placed on individual feelings
and intimate relations, the historical, structural, and international dimensions of 
confl ict are generally obscured in this approach (Pupavac, 2000).
These days, peace education, trauma counseling, transitional justice mechanisms,
and other reconciliation measures are essential components of international inter-
vention during or after a confl ict, as they are seen as addressing both the conse-
quences and the causes of the confl ict. Development projects also include  activities
that explicitly address the psychological conditions of individuals and  communities,
such as peace education programs and confi dence building measures. Moreover,
as I noted above, the focus of development projects themselves has generally
moved away from material transformation to the psychological well-being of 
recipients.
Throughout the revival of tradition in the Acholi sub-region, outside agencies
projected this conception of the vulnerable self upon the Acholi people and their 
categorization of justice mechanisms upon the local practices in the sub-region.
Both before and after the ICC intervention, when non-Acholi actors such as aid 
donors, researchers, and lawyers portrayed “the tradition,” it was often a  refl ection
of their own desire for, or vision of, a particular way to govern the Acholi  people.
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In the camp setting, various functions including food and water supplies,
education, and medical treatment were provided and managed by aid agencies,
although their supplies rarely met the IDPs’ actual needs and were halted when
security conditions deteriorated. While the camps were often compared to
concentration camps (Mamdani, 2010), aid agencies eagerly sought to “heal the
trauma” of the Acholis and deployed psychosocial activities in various forms and 
methods, including traditional dances, songs, and rituals. In a sense, the situation
was the embodiment of what Žižek (2008: 42) calls the two aspects of post-
political bio-politics: on the one hand, humans are reduced to “bare life,” to Homo
sacer—the so-called sacred being who is the object of expert caretaking knowl-
edge but is excluded from all rights—and on the other hand, respect for the
vulnerable Other is taken to the extreme through an attitude of narcissistic
subjectivity that experiences the self as vulnerable.
REVIVAL OF ACHOLI TRADITION IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL HISTORY
Despite the outside agencies’ desire for therapeutic governance, this vision may
not have been shared by all the Acholi proponents of tradition who have coope-
rated with outside agencies. This section describes the outside intervention within
the context of the local history and shows that the therapeutic paradigm may
have been (re)interpreted differently by various Acholi actors.
This is not the fi rst time in the Acholi sub-region that outside actors placed 
local practices within a framework that refl ected their own vision of governance.
For instance, medical anthropologists and medical professionals increasingly started 
to term such local practices as “traditional healing,” “traditional medicine,” or 
“alternative medicine” in the latter half of the twentieth century. As explained by
Allen (2008), the kind of practices recently described as “Acholi traditional  justice”
are the same sorts of activities that have been noted in Uganda and elsewhere
by researchers and professionals working in the fi eld of public health. The same
practices “can be viewed as dispensers of ‘traditional healing’ as well as ‘ traditional
justice’” (Allen, 2008: 50). While these professionals conceptualized and under-
stood the local practices within their framework of public health, in the course
of their efforts to train and cooperate with local actors, new kinds of hybrid heal-
ers emerged (Allen, 2008: 50). Another example can be found in the colonial
period, when Christian missionaries tried to make sense of the “Acholi religion”
in their effort to properly translate Christian ideas into the local language and 
thereby civilize the Acholis (Behrend, 1999). A highly complex process of reor-
ganizing and reformulating meanings and relationships between local and Chris-
tian concepts resulted in new and hybrid concepts and worldviews (Behrend,
1999). For example, it was through the interaction with Christianity that a new
kind of spirit medium called nebi (20) emerged after independence.
Incorporating both traditional and Christian ideas, nebis played the roles that had 
been formally fulfi lled by chiefs and elders, whose authority had already declined due
in part to the policies employed by the colonial administration and post-independence
regimes. In fact, Joseph Kony’s predecessor, Alice Lakwena of the Holy Spirit Move-
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ment (HSM), fi rst emerged as a nebi in the 1980s (Behrend, 1991).
In the midst of societal confusion during the 1980s, chiefs and elders prob-
lematized the vengeful spirits brought by young soldiers who had committed 
crimes under the Okello regime and then fl ed to the north after the regime was
overthrown. The chiefs and elders tried to use Acholi tradition to make these
young soldiers submit to their authority, but many of the soldiers were unwilling
to go through their ritual processes (Behrend, 1998: 248–249). The chiefs and 
elders claimed that such “impure” soldiers were the roots of all evil, and that 
such transgression against the moral order was causing further suffering and 
disorder in the society, creating a cycle of violence. As argued by Behrend (1998),
Lakwena was able to gain a certain level of support from the Acholi because she
was able to fulfi ll the role that the chiefs and elders had failed to execute. She
cleansed the soldiers and others of the vengeful spirits and fought against  witchcraft 
and sorcery through her own rituals, which included both “traditional” and Chris-
tian elements (Behrend, 1995: 64). As though she were a chief, she also provided 
moral education and set up regulations and codes of conduct so that the moral
community would be reconstituted (Behrend, 1991). However, in attempting to
cleanse the society and restore moral order, her logic of the war against the
external enemy (Museveni’s government) as well as against internal “impure”
elements easily legitimized her cleansing, or killing, directed at fellow Acholis
whom she deemed “impure.” (21)
After the HSM was defeated by the government forces, the already eroded 
authority of the chiefs and elders was further attacked by Joseph Kony of the
LRA. He also cleansed its members of witchcraft and sorcery through his own
hybrid rituals and made them adhere to his code of conduct. While fi ghting against 
the government, as Lakwena did, he increasingly directed fi erce attacks on “impure”
Acholis who did not support his army.
Furthermore, in the 1990s, aid agencies came to regard the Acholis as trauma-
tized and, therefore, started to provide counseling, psychotherapy, or psychologi-
cal treatments. What can be understood as a consequence of vengeful spirits was
now regarded as a symptom of “trauma.” An increasing number of aid agencies
tried to heal the Acholis based on their own psychologized understanding of the
causes and consequences of the confl ict as well as its solution. They started to
tell people that former LRA members were having nightmares due to their  traumatic
experiences and that they could be healed through psychological programs  provided 
by aid agencies. Such an argument implicitly denied the claim that former LRA 
members were suffering because of the vengeful spirits brought about by their 
conduct and that required ritual processes organized by chiefs and elders. In
addition, the power and infl uence of Christian leaders, who worked closely with
aid agencies and played a role in peace negotiations between the government and 
the LRA in the 1990s, also increased in the sub-region. Moreover, born-again
churches and organizations, which generally perceived Acholi tradition as satanic,
enjoyed a growing following in the sub-region. Some international Christian NGOs
tried to convert former LRA members in the name of “trauma care” while  telling
them that Acholi tradition was satanic.
It was under such circumstances that Acholi tradition gained attention from aid 
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agencies and was subsequently revived. As I argued earlier, it received attention
and support because aid agencies came to see individual psychological dysfunc-
tionalism and broken social relationships as the root causes as well as the
consequences of confl ict, and thus, considered healing, reconciliation, and the
reconstruction of social relationships essential. Acholi tradition was expected to
serve this purpose.
However, such a psychologized understanding of the confl ict may not have
been shared by all the Acholi actors who cooperated in the revival. In fact, the
psychologized narrative of aid agencies may have had some resonance with the
way in which the confl ict was understood by chiefs and elders in the sub-region.
As I mentioned above, in the 1980s, chiefs and elders claimed that the crisis was
a moral one. They held that the transgression against the moral order was  causing
further suffering and disorder, thereby creating a cycle of violence. The  subsequent 
unending war, further confusion, and further erosion of their authority and power 
may have confi rmed their view. Thus, even without sharing the postmodern con-
ception of the self, or the psychologized understanding of the war, the elders may
have generally agreed that the collapse of the social and moral order had brought 
on the war and confusion, resulting in the further erosion of their tradition,
requiring “healing,” the “revival of the tradition,” and a “culture of peace based 
on tradition” so that the “cycle of violence” would be stopped.
Furthermore, like most Acholi people, many chiefs and elders were living in
distress in the overcrowded IDP camps, relying on humanitarian aid. Therefore,
as long as they gained access to donor funds, they may not have been concerned 
about the way in which donors framed Acholi tradition.(22) In the course of my
research, many proponents of Acholi tradition seemed well aware that donors
supported Acholi tradition, in part, because of their concern about the Acholi
people’s alleged trauma. One elder who often had contact with donors noted the
following:
The meaning attached to Western words is not necessarily the meaning we
attach to the same words, such as trauma. To us, that meaning is very light.(23)
Our meaning is much deeper and heavier than they think. It is more than
trauma. It is the soul of the deceased that causes problems.(24)
In response to my question about whether he explained this view to donors
such as foreign NGO staff, he answered in the negative:
We usually interact with them very offi cially. They have already decided 
the way they conceive.(25)
As I noted earlier, many aid agencies tend to encourage psychosocial activities
based on local culture, tradition, or religion so long as they seem to bring about 
consequences similar to those provided by activities more strictly founded on
psychology. Likewise, many Acholi proponents of tradition may not have been
very concerned about the way it was framed by aid donors as long as they pro-
vided funding.
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Indeed, there was some concern and uneasiness among traditional leaders and 
Acholi NGO staff about activities such as counseling and psychotherapy because
they understood these activities as more strictly based on Western psychology.
However, in trying to discourage foreign aid personnel from carrying out such
activities, the Acholi actors did not deny the therapeutic understanding of Acholi
individuals and the confl ict, and instead presented traditional practices as more
appropriate in healing trauma in the Acholi context.
As the above remark of the elder may imply, it is almost impossible for Acholi
actors to receive donor funding unless their proposals fi t within the frameworks
that donors have already set. However, by utilizing the donors’ frameworks and 
negotiating with the Western psychological approach, the chiefs and elders were
able to try to recapture their lost power and status.
When the ICC announced its planned investigation into the situation in north-
ern Uganda, it was the fi rst time that many Acholi NGO staff and traditional
leaders had heard of the court. Most of them were unaware of the detailed 
theoretical distinctions between restorative and retributive justice mechanisms
frequently employed in the study of transitional justice. Therefore, as pointed out 
earlier in this paper, many did not clearly distinguish between restorative and 
retributive ideas in the narratives when they talked to outside agencies. However,
in their interactions with outside agencies, they seem to have been generally
accustomed to presenting their tradition as something effective in healing, recon-
ciliation, restoring relationships, or reintegrating and rehabilitating ex-soldiers. As
new supporters and advocates entered the arena of Acholi traditional justice after 
the ICC intervention, new funds were made available to support the activities of 
the traditional leaders and tradition-related activities in general.
When contextualized within the longer history of the Acholi sub-region, the
revival of Acholi tradition since the 1990s along with the attention and  enthusiasm
accorded to Acholi traditional justice following the ICC intervention enabled the
chiefs and elders to try, albeit in a new and hybrid form, to reorder the society,
re-establish social norms, and regain their power and status (Dolan, 2002). Their 
cooperation with the outside agencies seems to have entailed resonance and 
compromise with, as well as resistance against, the psychologized account of the
confl ict and the people’s suffering.
Interestingly, the recent revival of Acholi tradition is somewhat comparable to
the attempts of Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony to cleanse the society and restore
moral order. In the 1990s, Bradbury (1999: 20) argued the following:
...an interesting aspect of the emphasis on Acholi traditional practices is the
way it resembles the efforts of Lakwena and Kony to “cleanse” Acholi
society of evil spirits and witches. The traditional ritual practices of elders
seem to be being pitched against the rituals of Kony. Perhaps the battle is
not just for the “hearts and minds” of the Acholi, but also for the soul.
As I noted earlier, chiefs and elders tried to use Acholi tradition to make the
young soldiers submit to their authority in the 1980s, by emphasizing their 
“ impurity” and arguing for their need to be cleansed through the ritual processes
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that they organized. Their initial and immediate strong reaction against the ICC
may have had as much to do with their vision of social and moral order as with
their concern about the timing, one-sidedness, and possible political abuse of the
intervention. They were indeed worried that the ICC would be used as a  political
tool by the Ugandan government that wanted to legitimize its policy of “military
solution” to the confl ict. They also claimed that the ICC was unlikely to deal
with the crimes committed by the government forces. They feared that the court’s
intervention would push the LRA to commit more atrocities against the Acholis
and would complicate any efforts to negotiate with the LRA. At the same time,
they may have perceived the intervention as one that would interfere with their 
effort to reorder the society.
Nevertheless, I should not exaggerate the current level of power and authority
of the traditional leaders in the sub-region. As I noted earlier, their power and 
authority had already waned before the confl ict started in the 1980s. The subse-
quent long war and displacement meant that some Acholis, especially the youth,
do not even know the names of their clan chiefs. Furthermore, some chiefs and 
elders do not recognize the authority of the KKA or the paramount chief. There
are those inside who point out the internal division and discontent within the
KKA.(26) Others are envious of some chiefs who appear to have enriched  themselves
in the course of the renewed attention to so-called tradition. Furthermore, some,
especially women and young Acholis, fear that the empowerment of the elders
and chiefs may mean forced submission to their authority. As young, educated 
Acholis who use PCs and the Internet have become the main force within the
aid industry in the sub-region, the authority of the KKA and the chiefs and elders
in general is not very highly regarded even by those within the industry these
days. In addition, as I mentioned earlier, there are Christian leaders with a  certain
level of infl uence in this area who tend to describe Acholi traditional justice in
their Christian language. They also cooperate with aid donors, implement 
 psychosocial activities, and have their own cleansing rituals for former LRA 
members “to offer thanksgiving and ask for blessing and safekeeping from God”
(International Rescue Committee, 2002). Furthermore, the number of born-again
churches and followers has been increasing in the area. They generally reject 
so-called traditional practices as satanic, and they, too, offer their own cleansing
methods. Some relatively young Acholis have university degrees in psychology
or have attended courses in counseling. Some of them now work for aid  agencies,
and provide counseling or psychological treatment. In addition, some aid  agencies
train chiefs, elders, and others in basic skills in counseling and psychological
support (Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief, 2001). The ICC has conducted 
outreach activities in the area to build and maintain support for the court and to
sensitize people to the rights of victims and witnesses, including their access to
reparation and psychological care, reassuring people that the ICC can work hand 
in hand with Acholi tradition.
A detailed and careful examination is needed with regard to what the revival
of Acholi tradition brings about in the sub-region, where various actors explain
the “tradition” based on differing, and at times hybrid, worldviews. Such an
examination will also need to take into account the broader and longer-term
129Revival of Tradition in the Era of Global Therapeutic Governance
context. During the course of the revival since the 1990s, much attention has
been paid to the inner problems of the Acholi people as both the consequences
and causes of the confl ict. After the ICC intervention, overwhelming focus was
placed on the issue of Acholi traditional justice versus ICC justice. In such debates,
how best to deal with the crimes committed by the LRA and how to psycho-
logically heal “traumatized” Acholis were deemed to be crucial issues to peace
building and confl ict prevention. However, such attention may have overshadowed 
the responsibility of the Ugandan government and shifted attention away from
the historical or international contexts of the confl ict, for instance, colonial rule,
which created the country’s north-south divide. Other international dimensions of 
the confl ict, such as the relation between Uganda and Sudan, Western countries’
political, economic, and military support to the Museveni regime, and the  negligence
of the situation in northern Uganda in the 1990s, were not given much attention
either. The emphasis on the need to heal the “traumatized” (and, thus, potentially
violent) Acholis may have reinforced the innately violent image of the Acholi
people originally forged through colonial rule and then utilized by the current 
regime.
CONCLUSION
As Pupavac (2000) argues, global therapeutic governance pathologizes war-
affected populations as emotionally dysfunctional and problematizes their right to
self-government and autonomy, leading to extensive external intervention. As the
case of the revival of Acholi tradition shows, based on the therapeutic paradigm,
outside actors have been able to legitimize far-reaching interventions into various
aspects of Acholi social life, including traditional rituals, relationships within the
family and the clan, and individuals’ emotions. The therapeutic narrative of Acholi
tradition developed through the revival process dominated the debates over tran-
sitional justice after the ICC intervention, with possible infl uence on the course
of the confl ict itself.
Despite this “triumph of the therapeutic” (Rieff, 1966) in international aid, the
case of the revival of Acholi tradition also shows that global therapeutic  governance
is not necessarily a consolidated project; rather, it is one that is fragile and replete
with tensions and contradictions. The Acholi sub-region has not been a simple
laboratory for peace building in which outside actors can carry out experiments
in social engineering without being (re)interpreted, tamed, negotiated, or resisted 
by local actors. The therapeutic understanding of war and its underpinning
conception of the vulnerable self were not straightforwardly embraced or repro-
duced by Acholi actors. Instead, the therapeutic paradigm seems to have been
(re)interpreted, utilized, and circumvented by various Acholi actors with differing,
and at times hybrid, worldviews and visions of governance. This implies how
limited outside agencies can be in putting their policies and visions into practice,
that is, how fragile their authority can be. The social relations that have been, or 
will be, “restored” as a result are unlikely to be the same as those that existed 
before the confl ict started, nor do they seem to function in the exact way that 
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international policymakers would have expected. What the analysis of this paper 
unveils is not so much the vulnerability of the “traumatized” Acholis, but that of 
global therapeutic governance itself.
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NOTES
(1) The fi eldwork was conducted in March–April 2006, February–March 2008, November–
December 2008, and January–February 2010 in Uganda. I have been working as a policy
offi cer in the humanitarian section of an international NGO since 2003. Although I am
not directly in charge of issues related to the confl ict in northern Uganda, the fact that 
they are handled by other staff in the humanitarian section has enabled me to observe the
arguments within the organization and among the wider circle of NGOs, researchers, the
ICC, and others. The fi eldwork was conducted as part of my doctoral research, not in the
course of my work for the NGO. Therefore, most interviewees in Uganda were not aware
of my affi liation with the NGO. The analysis in this paper is my own and does not refl ect 
the position of the NGO.
(2) April 24, 2011.
(3) Central African Republic, Darfur in Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Northern Uganda, and Republic of Kenya.
(4) In the Acholi sub-region today, “traditional leaders” refers to chiefs and elders of various
clans. Christian and Muslim leaders are generally called “religious leaders.”
(5) The confl ict has affected other sub-regions of northern Uganda, southern Sudan, eastern
parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic.
(6) Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen.
(7) Article 17 of the Statute. The principle of complementarity grants primary jurisdiction
over the crimes defi ned in the Rome Statute to the respective States Parties on whose
territory, or by whose nationals, the alleged crimes are committed.
(8) Raska Lukwiya and Vincent Otti.
(9) This literally means, “drinking of the bitter root.”  The ritual includes the shared drinking
of a bitter juice made from the oput tree.
(10) The terms are mentioned in Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. (2005: 127).
(11) The spirit of the dead is said to bring misfortune in the form of nightmares, sickness, and 
even death to the family or clan of the guilty party until an appropriate process is carried 
out.
(12) Interview with an Acholi NGO staff member on March 31, 2006, in Gulu town. She was
one of the NGO workers who often explained “Acholi traditional justice” to foreign
researchers and the media.
(13) Interview with an Acholi NGO staff member on February 13, 2008, in Gulu town.
Similarly, culu kwor, often translated as “pay compensation” is also translated as
“ retaliate.”  In an Acholi language textbook, culu kwor is used to translate “retaliate” and 
“vengeance” (Festo, 2000: 158, 187).
131Revival of Tradition in the Era of Global Therapeutic Governance
(14) He is a Christian who worked for an international NGO in Uganda in the 1980s, then as
a social development adviser at the Department for International Development (DFID)
of the UK (Allen, 2005: 67; Dolan, 2000: 8).
(15) The term literally means “Chief of All Chiefs” or “Head of Chiefs.”
(16) “Traditional” or “cultural” institutions and leaders are protected and regulated under the
1995 Constitution.
(17) There are some exceptions, which referred to the anthropological studies conducted 
 before the confl ict (Hovil & Quinne, 2005; J. Okumu, 2005).
(18) There are some exceptions, where the local practices are narrated as a restorative justice
mechanism (e.g., Human Rights and Peace Centre & Liu Institute for Global Issues,
2003).
(19) It needs to be noted that colonial boundaries between the ruler and ruled, civilized and 
savage, rational and irrational, white and black were murky, took much hard work to
sustain, and were repeatedly subverted (Cooper & Stoler, 1997).
(20) From the Hebrew word, nabi, for prophet in the Old Testament (Behrend, 1999: 124).
(21) For instance, those accused of practicing or using witchcraft or sorcery, impure soldiers,
and other rebel groups (Behrend, 1998: 247).
(22) This was pointed out by Chris Dolan in a conversation with the author in March 2008.
Dolan worked as a research offi cer at the ACORD offi ce in Gulu in the late 1990s.
(23) In the eyes of the elder, the meaning that the donors attach to the term “trauma” is super-
fi cial compared to the meaning he would give.
(24) Interview with an Acholi elder on February 12, 2008, in Gulu town.
(25) The idea here is that foreign NGOs arrived with preconceived notions and assumptions.
(26) Interview with an Acholi elder on February 12, 2008, in Gulu town.
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